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Re: State v. Grossi, Case No. 20020151-CA 
U.R.A.P. 24(i) Letter 
Dear Court Clerk: 
The State submits this letter to the clerk of the court pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
On page 22 of his opening brief, defendant treated the trial court's finding that he 
consented to the officer's entry into the apartment as a conclusion of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Aplt. Brf. at 22. Defendant also argued in both his opening brief and reply 
brief that evidence of consent may not be ambiguous, but must be clear and unequivocal. 
Aplt. Brf. at 24-25; Rply Brf. at 2-3 & n. 1. The State disputed both points in its brief. See 
Aple. Brf. at 10-11. On December 20, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court settled these issues in 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at f f 48-50. Reference to Hansen, therefore, is necessary 
for a proper determination of the issues in this appeal. 
Sincerely, 
Jeffrey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Heather Johnson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
Lana Taylor, Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
ALBERT JAMES GROSSI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020151-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8{l)(a)(ii)(Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
to suppress the evidence seized from his home. 
Standard of Review. 'The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 
1 
P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.),cert. denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Veteto, 
2000UT62,f 8,6 P3d 1133. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to a 
determination of this case. That amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1999), possession 
of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). R. 2-4. 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. R. 167: 
66. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home. R. 34. Following 
an evidentiary hearing, R. 168, the trial court denied defendant's motion and entered findings 
2 
and conclusions. R. 84-91,102-06. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to an amended count 
of possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, and the remaining charges were dismissed. 
See R. 119-28. Pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant 
conditioned his guilty plea on the right to appeal the trial court's suppression order. See 121. 
The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years, but suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months. R. 130-32. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 134. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS1 
On November 15,2000, Officers Jason Knight and Perry Beauchaine were dispatched 
to a Salt Lake City apartment on a report that a male was assaulting two females. R. 168:4-6 
(R. 102: \ 1). As the officers arrived on the scene, Chandra Karren ran up to Officer Knight 
yelling that a man was beating up her friend—Andrea Layne. R. 168: 6 (R. 102-03: f 2). 
She told Officer Knight that Layne "was being dragged down the stairs by her hair and that 
she was six months pregnant." R. 168: 7, 21. She also informed the officer that she heard 
Layne within the apartment yelling, "stop hitting me." R. 168: 7. 
The two officers descended the stairs to the basement apartment and Officer Knight 
knocked on defendant's front door. R. 167: 52; R. 168: 7 (R. 103:13). Defendant peered 
out from the darkened apartment through a window panel to the door but did not open the 
1
 Because the trial court's decision denying the motion to suppress was based on 
testimony from both the suppression hearing (R. 168) and the preliminary hearing (R. 
167), see R. 84, the State cites to the evidence from both hearings. See also R. 168: 67-
68. The trial court's findings are cited parenthetically. 
3 
door. R. 168:7-8,12.2 Because he needed to check on the welfare of Layne and because the 
inability to observe defendant's activity behind the door jeopardized the officers' safety, 
Officer Knight asked that defendant open the door. R. 168: 8 (R. 103: f 4); see also R. 167: 
23. Defendant refused, indicating that he did not want to go to jail. R. 168: 9,22 (R. 103: 
U 5). Officer Knight told defendant he would not leave until he verified that Layne was 
unharmed. R. 168:9-10. Defendant insisted that she was "fine" and called out to her to tell 
Officer Knight that she was "okay." R. 168: 9-10. She did not respond. R. 168: 9-10. 
Later, defendant told Officer Knight that Layne was going out a cellar door—a reference not 
understood by Knight. R. 168: 10,26,32. Meanwhile, and unbeknownst to Officer Knight, 
Officer Beauchaine went to the back of the building after a young woman alerted him that 
Layne was trying to exit out the back door. R. 167: 52-53; R. 168: 10. When Knight 
realized he was alone, he radioed for additional backup. R. 168: 10-11,31. 
After further coaxing from Officer Knight, defendant cracked open the door, but still 
refused to step out. R. 168: 10. Finally, after ten minutes of negotiation, defendant exited 
the apartment, leaving the door ajar, and reluctantly allowed Officer Knight to search him 
for weapons. R. 168: 11,14,21-22,32,44 (R. 103: % 6). Officer Beauchaine returned from 
the back and assisted Officer Knight in then handcuffing defendant. R. 168: 11-13,42,44. 
At that time, he advised Officer Knight that a woman, presumably Layne, had fled the 
apartment from a side door. R. 168: 14-15, 27-28, 42-43, 47. The officers escorted 
2The apartment was dark because the power had been shut off. R. 167: 35; R. 168: 
33-34. 
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defendant to a patrol car where he was detained while Officer Knight continued his 
investigation. SeeR. 168: 13-14. 
After interviewing Karren and a second witness, Officer Knight returned to the patrol 
car and notified defendant that he was being arrested for interfering with the investigation. 
R. 168: 14-16, 59. At that time, defendant told Officer Knight that "[h]e wanted his 
apartment locked up and secured." R. 167: 26-27; R. 168: 16, 27, 37, 43 (R. 103: f 7). 
Officer Knight would not permit defendant to do so, but indicated that he would lock the 
door for him. R. 168: 27, 43-44 (R. 103: t 8); see also R. 168: 60. Upon returning to the 
apartment, however, Officer Knight found that he could not lock the door without a key. R. 
167: 9; R. 168: 16. Accordingly, he walked back to the patrol car and asked defendant for 
the key to the door. R. 167: 9,27, 56-57; R. 168: 16. Defendant told him he did not have 
the key but he believed Layne might have it. R. 167:9,57-58; R. 168:16. Again, defendant 
requested that the apartment be secured. See R. 167: 58. 
Officers Knight and Beauchaine returned to the apartment and stepped inside in an 
attempt to secure it (Officer Knight intending to lock the front door and Officer Beauchaine 
intending to lock the back door). R. 167: 58-59; R. 168: 16. As he looked for a way to lock 
the door, Karren unexpectedly emerged from the bedroom. R. 168: 17, 33-35,42 (R. 103: 
U 9); see also R. 167:10-11,30,60. Surprised to find Karren inside and suspecting that she 
might be burglarizing the apartment, the officers detained Karren to find out why she was 
there. R. 167: 11,60-61; R. 168: 17. Karren explained that she had returned to retrieve her 
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coat, but acted very nervous—much more so than when she first reported the assault to 
Officer Knight. R. 167: 11; R. 168: 17. 
Concerned that she may have retrieved a weapon, the officers conducted a quick pat 
down search. R. 168: 11;R. 168: 17. Then, prompted by Karren's unexpected emergence 
from the bedroom, her persistent nervous behavior, and the nature of domestic violence 
disputes, Officer Knight conducted a cursory sweep of the apartment to make certain that no 
one else was inside and to determine whether the victim of the assault might also have 
returned. R. 168: 17, 23-24, 34-37 (R. 103: f 10); see also R. 167: 11-12. Aided by a 
flashlight, Officer Knight scanned the bedroom and observed a number of illicit drugs and 
paraphernalia in plain view. R. 168: 18-19, 33-34 (R. 103: f 11). The contraband was 
thereafter seized and defendant was charged for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. 
R. 2-4; R. 168: 17,19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence seized from his home following his arrest. Contrary to defendant's claim, Officer 
Knight was justified in stepping inside the doorway to lock the door because defendant 
consented to the limited entry for the purpose of securing the apartment. In addition, 
securing the premises is a legitimate State interest justifying a limited and minimal intrusion. 
Officer Knight's subsequent security sweep of the premises was reasonably prompted by Ms. 
Karren's unexpected presence in the apartment, her persistent nervous behavior, and the 
6 
volatile and unpredictable nature of domestic violence disputes. The Court should therefore 
affirm the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT SEIZURE OF THE 
CONTRABAND WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW 
DOCTRINE. 
Under the plain view doctrine, incriminating "objects falling in the plain view of an 
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may 
be introduced in evidence." Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct 992, 993 
(1968) (per curiam); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535,1543 (1983); 
see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,465,91 S.Ct. 2022,2037 (1971). "[A] 
warrantless seizure is [therefore] justified if: (1) the officer is lawfully present where the 
search and seizure occur; (2) the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the evidence is clearly 
incriminating." State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983). The only issue raised by 
defendant on appeal is whether Officer Knight was lawfully present in the bedroom doorway 
when he observed the contraband. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. He does not dispute that the 
contraband was in plain view of the officer when he opened the bedroom door, nor does he 
dispute the clearly incriminating nature of the contraband. 
The plain view doctrine "provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's 
access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Brown, 460 
U.S. at 738, 103 S.Ct. at 1541; accord Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 
2301, 2308 (1990). The law is well settled that police entry into a house is justified only if 
7 
officers "comply[ ] with the warrant requirement or satisfy[ ] one of its recognized 
exceptions—e.g., through a valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances." Soldal 
v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,65-66,113 S.Ct. 538,545-46 (1992). The plain view doctrine 
thus encompasses "the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for 
specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of 
incriminating character." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. 2037. Likewise, the seizure 
is lawful "[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an 
article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement," e.g., through consent or exigent circumstances. Id. 
Police did not have a warrant here. Accordingly, the admissibility of the evidence 
turns on whether Officer Knight's presence in the apartment was justified by an exception 
to the warrant requirement. In this case, Officer Knight's presence must be justified at two 
junctures. He must have been justified in entering the apartment initially and he must have 
been justified in proceeding further to the bedroom. Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, 
the officer's presence in the apartment was justified in both instances. Defendant consented 
to Officer Knight's initial entry for the limited purpose of securing his apartment. And 
although defendant did not consent to further entry, Officer Knight's sweep of the bedroom 
was justified by the exigency created by Karren's unexpected presence in the apartment. 
A. DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO THE OFFICERS' LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE 
APARTMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING THE APARTMENT. 
In upholding the plain view seizure of the contraband, the trial court concluded that 
"Officer Knight was justified in entering the defendant's apartment to lock the door because 
8 
the defendant wanted the apartment secured, but was unable to do it himself as a result of his 
arrest." R. 104: f 4; see also R. 89 (concluding in its memorandum decision "that Officer 
Knight entered the defendant's apartment lawfully (i.e., by a request), to secure the apartment 
(a need which the defendant himself communicated) ").3 Defendant contends that the 
trial court's determination that defendant consented to the entry was error. Aplt. Brf. at 21-
25. Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, rather than treating the consent 
determination as a factual finding, defendant treats it as a legal conclusion subject to the 
more stringent correctness standard. See Aplt. Brf. at 22. Second, the trial court's finding 
of consent is, contrary to defendant's claim, supported by the evidence introduced at both the 
preliminary hearing and suppression hearing. 
1. The Trial Court's Finding That Defendant Requested the Officer to 
Secure His Apartment Is Reviewed for Clear Error. 
A trial court's decision denying a motion to suppress is subject to a bifurcated 
standard of appellate review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). "[T]he legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure 
of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Moreno, 
910P.2datl247. 
3The trial court's "Memorandum Decision" is reproduced in Addendum A and the 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" are reproduced in Addendum B. 
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Defendant contends that a trial court's determination of a defendant's consent is a 
conclusion of law. Aplt. Brf at 22. However, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), reviewed the trial court's consent determination for clear error. 
After observing that a trial court's finding of fact may not be set aside "unless it is clearly 
erroneous," the Court held that the "prosecution's assertion [at the suppression hearing] that 
consent was given is not evidence and cannot support a finding of consent." Id. at 687. 
Thus, the Court held, "the trial court's finding of consent is clearly erroneous." Id.4 The 
Arroyo decision therefore establishes that a trial court's determination of consent is not a 
legal conclusion as claimed by defendant, but a factual finding "reviewed under the 
deferential clearly-erroneous standard." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247. 
2. The Evidence and the Reasonable Inferences from the Evidence Support the 
Trial Court's Finding That Defendant Consented to the Officer's Entry for 
the Purpose of Securing His Apartment. 
An appellate court will find factual findings clearly erroneous only if "the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against attack." State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). The Court will 
therefore "'consider the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination,' and 
defer to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility." State v. Mogen, 2002 UT App 
235, f 16, 52 P.3d 462 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996)). 
4A trial court's determination that a consent was voluntary is, on the other hand, a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 42, 37 P.3d 
1073. However, defendant has not argued on appeal that any consent given was 
involuntary—that is, "'the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.'" Id. at f 47 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973)). 
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Reversal is appropriate only if the "findings so lack support as to be 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence/" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, U 17 n.2,1 P.3d 1108 (citations omitted). 
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances supported the trial court's finding that defendant consented to the entry for 
purposes of securing the apartment. At the suppression hearing, Officer Knight testified on 
direct examination that he entered the apartment because defendant "wanted his apartment 
locked up and secured." R. 168:16. Later, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked: 
Okay. Now, at this time you clearly remembered the exact words that 
[defendant] used with regard to the statements about wanting you to go in and 
secure his apartment for him. I mean this is clear to you. You can clearly 
remember it, right? 
R. 168: 27 (emphasis added). Officer Knight responded, "I don't know if they're the exact 
words but that's what he was want [sicj, yes." R. 168: 27 (emphasis added). 
In an attempt to show that he did not ask the officers to secure the apartment, 
defendant called one of his former neighbors who testified that defendant asked that he be 
allowed to lock the door. R. 168: 60. The neighbor testified that when the officers refused 
defendant's request, indicating that they would lock it for him, defendant said, "No, let me 
take care of it (inaudible) couple a minutes." R. 168: 60. The trial court, however, expressly 
found Officer Knight's testimony "to be credible (based upon his appearance, demeanor and 
words)." R. 86 (emphasis in original). The court made no such finding with respect to the 
neighbor's testimony. As noted above, this Court will "defer to the trial court's assessment 
of witness credibility." Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, at^ f 16. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, 
that the neighbor's testimony conflicted with Officer Knight's testimony, the appellate court 
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will defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence. As once observed by this Court, 
"[b]ecause 'the truth is rarely pure and never simple,' the trial judge is in the best position 
to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting evidence." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 
1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
The trial court's finding is also supported by other evidence. For example, Officer 
Beauchaine's testimony at the preliminary hearing corroborated Officer Knight's testimony 
that defendant requested him to secure the apartment. In his examination of Officer 
Beauchaine, defense counsel asked: "Did [defendant] ever say please, words to the effect of 
'Please go in and lock up my apartment'?" R. 167: 58. In response, Officer Beauchaine 
testified that he "believe[d] that there was a specific request by [defendant] because of his 
concern that he wanted us to secure the apartment for him." R. 167: 58. Defendant's 
conduct in connection with the officers' attempts to secure the apartment also supports a 
finding of consent. When Officer Beauchaine returned after discovering the apartment could 
not be locked from within, defendant cooperated by giving information concerning the key. 
Although he said that he did not have the key, he told officers that Layne might have it. R. 
167: 9. There was no testimony that defendant made any protests to the officers' effort to 
secure the apartment at that time. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,389 (Utah 1986) (finding 
consent to proceed to bedroom where defendant made no objection to officer following him 
there). Indeed, the evidence suggests that defendant again requested that the officers secure 
his apartment. See R. 167: 58 (Officer Beauchaine testifying to the conversation about the 
keys, which occurred after Officer Knight's initial attempt to secure the apartment). 
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Moreover, the neighbor's testimony, when viewed in context, is not inconsistent with 
a finding that defendant ultimately requested Officer Knight to secure the apartment for him. 
The evidence demonstrates that the neighbor only heard part of the conversation. See R. 168: 
60-61 (overhearing only a few comments in a conversation lasting at least a couple of 
minutes); R. 168: 59-63 (never recollecting a discussion regarding a key). In addition, 
Officer Knight did not entirely discount the possibility that defendant initially requested that 
he be allowed to lock the door himself. He did not recall such a conversation, but confirmed 
that had defendant requested permission to lock the door himself, he would not have 
permitted him to do so. R. 168: 27. This is consistent with the neighbor's testimony. In the 
end, however, Officer Knight testified that although he did not remember the exact words of 
the conversation, he did recall defendant making the request that he secure the apartment for 
him. See R. 168: 16, 27. The reasonable inference from this testimony is that when faced 
with the reality that he would not be permitted to lock the apartment himself, defendant 
requested the officers to do so. See Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76 (drawing all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in favor of the trial court's factual determination).5 
Defendant cites to three cases in support of his argument that the evidence did not 
support the trial court's consent determination: Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 
S.Ct. 1788 (1968); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1992); and United 
States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). See Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. Defendant's reliance 
on these cases is misplaced. The issue in Bumper was whether consent could be lawfully 
5
 Defendant does not suggest on appeal that he should have been permitted to lock 
the door himself. 
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obtained after a claim of authority to search. 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S.Ct. at 1791. Theofficers 
in this case made no claim of authority to search the apartment. The issue in Salinas-Cano 
was whether a consent to search a suitcase could be given by someone other than the owner 
of the suitcase. 959 F.2d at 862. There is no claim here that the officers received authority 
to secure the apartment from anyone other than defendant. Finally, the primary issue in Iribe 
was whether the consent to search the house was coerced. 11 F.3d at 1557. Again, there is 
no claim here that police coerced defendant into requesting that officers secure his 
apartment.6 
3. The Officer's Entry Is Further Justified By the Legitimate Need to Secure 
the Premises. 
The officers' entry into the apartment is further justified by law enforcement's 
legitimate need to secure the premises of an arrestee before he is transported to jail. In South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099 (1976), the U.S. Supreme 
Court observed that it "has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles 
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or 
6Defendant also observes that the Tenth Circuit in Iribe "emphasized that consent 
must be 'unequivocal and specific/ as well as 'freely and intelligently given/" Aplt. Brf. 
at 24 (quoting Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557). These requirements, however, are part of the 
three-part "presumption against waiver" test which was recently rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court, See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 47, 37 P.3d 1073. The Court in Bisner held 
that "[wjhen assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily, 
courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since 
Schneckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied/" Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041). 
In making that assessment, the court considers the '"totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances.'" Id. (citation omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that the consent 
was coerced. 
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protecting the car and its contents." The officers' entry here was not into a car, but an 
apartment, and did not rise to the level of an inventory of the premises. However, the interest 
in securing a home and its contents is no less important than that in securing a car and its 
contents. Cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741 (1987) 
(acknowledging that protecting an owner's property while in police custody is a strong 
governmental interest). Similarly, "searches" conducted for the purpose of securing property 
need not be performed "in a totally mechanical 'all or nothing' fashion." Florida v. Wells, 
495 U.S. 1,4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990). 
Like inventory searches of a car, steps to secure the home of an arrestee "'serve to 
protect an owner's property . . . [and] to ensure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized 
property '" Id. (quoting Bertine, 419 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. at 741). Where the search 
or entry was conducted not in the furtherance of a criminal investigation, but in the 
furtherance of a routine caretaking function, the policies underlying the warrant requirement 
are not implicated. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371,107 S.Ct. at 741. As observed by the high 
court in Bertine: 
"The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, 
not routine, noncriminal procedures . . . . The probable-cause approach is 
unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine 
administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that 
the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations." 
Id. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 371 n.5, 96 S.Ct. 3092). Thus, the applicable test in 
cases not involving the pursuit of crime is reasonableness. 
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The State does not suggest that an inventory search, as in the case of an impounded 
car, is appropriate. The expectations of privacy in a home are greater than those in an 
automobile and a home is not placed in the custody of police. However, taking necessary but 
limited measures to secure the home is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In this 
case, nothing in the record suggests that Officer Knight's initial entry into the apartment was 
but "a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Wells, 495 
U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 1635. Rather, the entry was made not only pursuant to defendant's 
request, but with the objective to protect defendant's property and in a manner consistent 
with Officer Knight's "established routine" in securing the premises. Id.; R. 167:37; R. 168: 
41. Such limited action does not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
B. THE CURSORY SWEEP OF THE APARTMENT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO 
ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS AND THE VICTIM. 
While defendant consented to the officers' entry for purposes of securing the 
apartment, he did not consent to further entry. Accordingly, Officer Knight's entry into the 
bedroom must be supported by exigent circumstances. The trial court determined that 
exigent circumstances did in fact justify further entry, concluding that "Officer Knight was 
justified in conducting a security sweep of the apartment because of his concerns that arose 
when he saw Ms. Karren inside the apartment." R. 104: f 5; accord R. 89. In its 
memorandum decision, the court held that "the narrow scope of Officer Knight's lawful entry 
was properly broadened when he observed the woman that he had first met when he arrived 
at the scene, [Ms. Karren], walking from the bedroom in the apartment." R. 89. The court 
explained that "[d]ue to [Karren's] nervous demeanor and the possibility that others might 
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be present in the apartment[,] Officer Knight reasonably believed that either he or the alleged 
victim (whose whereabouts was unclear to Officer Knight) could have been exposed to 
potential danger." R 89 I he coiirt thus concluded that "Officer Knight's decision to 
conduct a 'protective sweep"" of the apartment [ ] becai i le at i appropi iate and necessary 
security measure , to protect the officer and others, and to ascertain whether the victim had 
come back to the apartment and was injured." R. 89. 
On appeal nfeleiulamt .n^urs ih.it lb dull i ouil mcil mi \ mu'linlniu thai (lie officer's 
sweep of the premises was justified, contending that neither the protective sweep doctrine 
nor the exigent circumstances doctrine applied under the circumstances here. Aplt. Brf. at 
12-21, 27-31 Foi the reasons explained below defendant ^ iieniiienl i iiiiiis 
"Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing, [the U.S. Supreme Court] has said that reasonableness generally 
requites the obfaimni?, ol a |ueln i.il wanaitt " Veronia School District 4"\
 t \\ Acton,51 5 II S 
646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995). However, under the exigent eitenmsiani es 
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involvef ] a plausible claim of 
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois 
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these einajmstanee-. - ihe 
exigencies of the situation' make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the 
vvjiTiiiitless search is ob)eetne!\ ieasonable." Minceyv. Arizona, 4 W 11 S 385, 3i)3-l>4, *)S 
S.Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) {quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 I J.S 451. 456, 69 S.Ct. 
191,193(1948)). 
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This Court has defined "[e]xigent circumstances [as] those "'that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the 
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or 
some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."' State 
v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) {quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 
1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101 (1984)); accord State v. 
Wells, 928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) (holding that 
the court of appeals' "analysis of the motion to suppress is correct"). The courts have 
identified a number of variant situations that fall within the exigent circumstances exception, 
including the "emergency aid" doctrine, see Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT 12, ff 10-
13,27,994 P.2d 1283, the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131,1133-
35 (Utah App. 1991), and the "community caretaker" doctrine, see Provo City v. Warden, 
844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994) (affirming "for the 
reasons stated by the court of appeals"). The weapons frisk, authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and the protective sweep, authorized under Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990), are also appropriately treated as falling within 
the general rubric of exigent circumstances. See United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231,237-
38 (5th Cir. 2002) (analyzing protective sweep based on exigencies of situation) O fBrien v. 
City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (classifying the "stop and frisk" as 
an exigent circumstance). 
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In assessing exigent circumstances, courts employ a balancing test "rather than [ ] a 
per se rule of unreasonableness." McArthur, 121 S.Ct. at 950. The Court "balance[s] the 
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was 
reasonable." ld\ accord Bun "; 494 U.S. at 331, 11C S.C at 1096; Te? ry, 392 I f.S ; it 20-21, 
88 S.Ct. at 1879-80. "'While exigent circumstances have multiple characteristics, the 
guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts 
kiinnri 'not'ii', ,r* A1 ("if Mmi "Itin- utietl "n ( ityt)tth\*m \ Hvvtw HnX P Id 13K4. 1391 
(Utah App. 1994) {quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. ^4;, j /o N. W.2d 166,170 (Neb. 1985)). 
The trial court here correctly concluded that the exigencies facing Officer Knight at 
ilie Hint1" iiislilk'd ilit1 cursory mspeuinn * 1 licl :t u as ain led at protecting the officers as well 
as the victim. Umvu Knight had received information from Karren < violent 
confrontation between defendant and Layne. R, 168: 6-7, 21, Then, when Officer Knight 
asked defendant to step outside so that he could investigate the complaint, defendant refused 
to exit the apartment. R. 168: 7-10. 22 Finall) after ten i i lii itiites of coaxing, defendant 
complied with the officer's request R 168: 11. Against this backdrop, Officer Knight 
returned to the apartment to lock the dooi R 168: 14-16, 59 At that juncture, Officer 
Knight was only justified in entering the apartmnit h ihr extent nocrssaiv in -;o uiv the 
doors. However, the seemingly stabilized situation turned when Karren unexpectedly 
emerged from the bedroom. 
Although Kaii'cn explainedtluit she hail ,ta\\M tliit: ni^hl itnd ivliinuul lo icfnni\e her 
coat, she was very nervous. R. 167: 11; R. 168: 17. Her nervous behavior was inconsistent 
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with lawful conduct under the circumstances. Indeed, she would have no reason to be 
nervous if she was rightfully in the apartment or if she was otherwise doing nothing 
unlawful. Yet, Karren was more nervous than when she first reported the assault. R. 167: 
11. 
Officer Knight testified that the nature of the dispute also contributed to his concerns. 
R. 167:34-3 5. He testified that "[djomestic situations can be the most violent situations" that 
officers confront. R. 168: 45. This testimony is consistent with the pronouncements of the 
courts. This court has "acknowledged that 'a domestic violence complaint' is 'one of the 
most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police.'" State v. Comer, 
2002 UT App 219,J 25, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Richards, 779 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 
App. 1989)). As noted by the First Circuit, "violence may be lurking and explode with little 
warning." Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); see also State v. 
Greene, 784 P.2d 257, 259 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that domestic violence calls "commonly 
involve dangerous situations in which the possibility for physical harm or damage escalates 
rapidly"). 
While defendant's arrest may, to the untrained observer, appear to have eliminated 
any concerns for the safety of the victim or the officers, the record demonstrates that Officer 
Knight was still faced with many unknowns. For example, Layne ran away from the scene 
before she could be interviewed. R. 167: 53; R. 168:14-15,47. As a result, police never had 
an opportunity to assess her welfare. This case is therefore unlike State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 
802 (Ore. 1983), cited by defendant. See Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. As noted by defendant, the 
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victim in Davis calmly exited the motel room and did not appear frightened. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 30 (citing Davis, 666 P.2d at 804). Consequently, officers were able to determine that the 
victim was unharmed. See Davis, 666 P 2d at 804 In contrast, Layne fled the scene. 
OfficersKi J - indBeauehaitit1 t inn h.nl innppnrlunil'i Imletrmnnclhc nalun and t*\lrm 
of Layne's injuries. 
Officer Beauchaine further testified that a second woman, whose identity was not 
Is now n tlso i.iii horn Ihr ti'Milttinil il llic lime 1 d\m% I led Si #• K Ih ' SI \\w ntiiiets 
never had an opportunity to interview her or determine her role in the assault. Therefore, 
they did not know whether she was the second victim in the reported assault or an 
aeaiiinipliet: in Hit is^iull \\ In n K. ae apartment, the officers could 
reasonably infer that the victim or an accomplice might also have returned. 
Defendant asks this Court to summarily dismiss the officers' concerns, arguing that 
nothing suggests that others might be present, including Layne, or that Layne was in need 
of immediate assistance at all. This conclusion discounts the circumstance > discussed!1 ,\h n c 
and ignores the training and experience of the police officers. "Police officers by virtue of 
their experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity [and dangerous 
circumstances] where ordinary citizens would not ' SVr ShKc " I ' V / \ H , 7*l i} 2 I 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, u[s]ome recognition should appropriately be given to that 
experience and training where (as here) there are objective facts to justify the ultimate 
conclusion." I J \ntl undoubtedly addinp r - = - '- - • * . - -
apartment was dark. See R. 167: 35; R. 168: 33-34. 
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Defendant disputes the court's finding that Officer Knight conducted the security 
sweep in part to verify that the victim had not returned. Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. Defendant 
claims that the finding was clearly erroneous because Officer Knight did not mention the 
concern at the preliminary hearing and knew the victim was gone. Defendant, however, 
ignores that the trial court expressly found the officer "to be credible/' R. 86. As observed 
in Mogen, this Court will "defer to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility." 2002 
UT App 235, at f 16. Moreover, the officers did not know where the victim had gone, and 
therefore, they could not discount the possibility that the victim had returned unbeknownst 
to the officers, just as Karren returned to the apartment unbeknownst to the officers. Given 
this real possibility, the officers were justified in checking the apartment to determine 
whether she had returned, and if so, to render whatever aid she might need. 
In support of his claim that Officer Knight was not justified in conducting a cursory 
sweep of the apartment, defendant cites to four cases which rejected the government's claim 
that a search was justified as a protective sweep: Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 1987); 
Hayes v. State, 797 P.2d 962 (Nev. 1990); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560 (10th 
Cir. 1992); and United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969). Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. 
These cases are distinguishable. In Brown, officers conducted a sweep of the home in the 
course of executing a two-year-old arrest warrant for a traffic citation. 738 P.2d at 1093. In 
Hayes, officers conducted a sweep in the course of arresting the defendant for stealing an 
automobile a month before. 797 P.2d at 964. And in Baca, officers conducted a sweep of 
the appellants' home in the course of arresting them for parole violations. 417 F.2d at 104. 
22 
Thus, unlike the situation here, police in Brown, Hayes, and Baca were not confronted with 
a recently perpetrated crime of violence, the full impact of which remained uncertain. They 
were making arrests for cr ii nes tl lat were remote in tin i le ai 1 :! did not involve violence. 
Finally, in Anderson, officers conducted the sweep of defendant's home not because they 
were concerned for their safety, but because they were concerned that those inside the house 
might destroy evidence. 981 F.2dat 1563. As explained above, Officer Knight's sweep was 
prompted by a concern for the safety of himself and the victii i it , i lot by a desire to preserve 
evidence. 
As the decisions in Terry ami linh' make .."leai", officers air allow t\i lo lake reasonable 
measures to ensure their safety and the safety of others as they perform their lawful duties. 
As in Terry and Buie, Officer Knight did not conduct the limited search in a quest for 
before him, Officer Knight reasonably believed that the sweep was "necessary to prevent 
physical harm" to himself and the victim. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (internal quotes 
omitted) When t nutronled v illii illit' unexpected presence of karren in Ihe apartment, her 
unusually nervous demeanor, the volatile nature of domestic disputes, and the information 
still unknown to him, Officer Knight reasonably believed that someone else might be in the 
a p a r t m e n t , r it t in JUI a »\aitatit in tin1 i lelim 1 he trial \ ouil Iheie lnie c o n e i l l y e o m !u«lint that 
Officer Knight was justified in conducting the cursory inspection of the apartment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this Jjft^day of December, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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CASE NO. 001919867 
The parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on May 16, 
2001, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Suppress for 
Illegal Search and Seizure. The Court heard testimony from several 
witnesses and received exhibits consisting of photographs which 
were offered by the defense* At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Court ordered a transcript of the hearing to be prepared and gave 
the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental memoranda on the 
pending Motion to Suppress. On June 19, 2001, the Court extended 
the briefing schedule for the supplemental memoranda. On June 27, 
2001, the parties appeared before the Court for the purpose of 
presenting argument on the Motion to Suppress. At the conclusion 
of that hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court has now had an opportunity to review a transcript of 
the May 16, 2001, hearing, and a transcript of the preliminary 
hearing held on March 20, 2001, before Judge William W. Barrett. 
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The Court has also reviewed the exhibits offered during the May 16, 
2001, hearing, examined the numerous legal authorities cited by 
counsel in support of their respective positions and considered the 
testimony and argument offered during the hearings of May 16, 2001, 
and July 17, 2001. The Court now renders this Decision, based on 
the analysis set forth herein. 
LEGAL AMALYfllfl 
The defendant challenges the legality of his arrest and the 
police entry into his apartment, where incriminating materials were 
discovered, allegedly in plain view* The defendant argues that the 
police did not have the jprobable cause to arrest him because he had 
not committed any crime in their presence and that he had no 
obligation to allow the police to enter his home. The defendant 
also contends that subsequent to an illegal arrest, the police 
unlawfully entered his home and performed an unauthorized 
"protective sweep." 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the requirement of 
probable cause with respect to a warrantless arrest by stating 
that, "'The determination should be made on an objective standard: 
whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences 
which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect had committed the offense.'" (Emphasis added.) State v. 
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Colfi, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher. 27 
Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972) (footnote omitted)). 
In performing hie duties, the officer "is not required to meet any 
such standard of perfection as to demand an absolutely certain 
judgment before he may act." State v. Eastmond. 28 Utah 2d 129, 
132, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972) (footnote omitted). Requiring a 
police officer to be absolutely certain and perfect, would mean 
that the ability of the police to protect the citizenry would be 
hampered to the point of rendering police protection generally 
unavailable. 
In applying the objective standard articulated in Cole, this 
Court finds that the facts and circumstances in this case provided 
a reasonable basis for Officer Knight to conclude that the 
defendant had committed a crime* when he arrested him. 
Specifically, Officer Knight's testimony at the hearing on the 
Motion to Suppress, which this Court found to be credible, (based 
upon his appearance, demeanor and words) indicated that he was 
dispatched to the defendant's apartment because of a call that came 
in about a "male • . . assaulting two females." (Transcript of 
Motion to Suppress Hearing at p. 5). When Officer Knight arrived 
at the scene, he was ffigt by ft tV*T\%JQ womqn wft<? wag "yelling" ^ bout 
her pregnant friend being beaten, and being dragged down the stairs 
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When Officer Knight approached the door to the apartment, he 
testified that he could see the defendant through a glass panel in 
the door, but could not see the alleged victim. Officer Knight 
testified that although he repeatedly asked the defendant to open 
the <fo<?r so that he could verify the safety of the alleged victim. 
the tiefendant refuged* 
Under these circumstances and particularly in light of the 
information that Officer Knight had received about imminent harm to 
a pregnant woman, who was being beaten in the apartment; Officer 
Knight reasonably concluded that an assault had taken place and 
that the defendant was obstructing the officer's efforts to 
investigate and to prevent any further abuse of the alleged victim 
and assure her afety. This Court concludes that Officer Knight 
had sufficient cause to arrest the defendant when the defendant 
finally opened the door, after refusals and verbal reports of 
imminent danger, safety concerns about an alleged vulnerable victim 
and the defendant's unwillingness to open his door to speak to the 
police until considerable delay had occurred, make this clear. It 
is important to note the police were called to the scene (a 
distress call) and advised of criminal acts. The defendant 
initially refused to open the door and the alleged victim was not 
in view. Her safety was an issue requiring resolution. The 
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defendant's Motion to Suppress on the basis of an illegal arrest is 
denied. 
The Court next considers the legality of Officer Knight's 
entry into the defendant's apartment. The defendant focuses on a 
discrepancy in the testimony concerning Officer Knight's decision 
to secure the defendant's apartment. Officer Knight testified that 
he attempted to secure the apartment at the request of the 
defendant. Another witness who testified, Audrey Robbins, stated 
that she heard the defendant ask to secure the apartment. As the 
State points out in its briefing, this discrepancy is irrelevant 
because even if the defendant had asked to re-enter his apartment 
for the purpose of securing it, Officer Knight could have 
reasonably refused this request, both for his safety and the safety 
of the other officers and granted the request by securing the 
premises for the defendant. Moreover, in reviewing the testimony 
of both Officer Knight and Ms. Robbins, it is clear to the Court 
that both heard the defendant communicate a need to secure his 
apartment before he was taken to jail. This Court finds that once 
the defendant conveyed this need, Officer Knight lawfully entered 
the apartment for the purpose of locating the key to the front door 
(the only means of locking the door). 
Furthermore, the narrow scope of Officer Knight's lawful entry 
was properly broadened when he observed the woman that he had first 
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met when he arrived at the scene, Shandra, walking from the bedroom 
in the apartment. Due to Shandra*s nervous demeanor and the 
possibility that others might be present in the apartment; Officer 
Knight reasonably believed that either he or the alleged victim 
(whose whereabouts was unclear to Officer Knight) could have been 
exposed to potential danger inside the apartment. Officer 
Knight's decision to conduct a "protective sweep" of the apartment 
therefore became an appropriate and necessary security measure, to 
protect the officer and others, and to ascertain whether the victim 
had come back to the apartment and was injured. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Officer Knight entered the defendant's 
apartment lawfully (i.e., by a request), to secure the apartment (a 
need which the defendant himself communicated), and that Officer 
Knight was justified in conducting a protective sweep of the 
apartment, under the facts indicated, once he was inside. The 
Court therefore denies the defendant's Motion to Suppress in the 
entirety. 
The Court notes that while it is vital to protect a citizen's 
right to privacy and to be free from unlawful arrests and searches; 
a police officer must have the ability to protect the public when 
a serious crime to a person is reported to be occurring and the 
officer finds reason for concern upon arrival. The officer would 
have been remiss if he ignored the report of a crime without 
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conducting son* investigation to assure the safety of the alleged 
victim. When he encountered interference and/or obstruction in his 
investigation, his actions were warranted, as articulated above. 
Credible police officer testimony has been relied upon by this 
Court in making this assessment. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order consistent with, 
but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to 
the Court for review and signature. 
n f^— 
Dated this / *m&v of September ,/2 001» 
JLII A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 001919867FS 
Judge LESLIE LEWIS 
This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on May 16, 2001, and July 
27, 2001, before the Court, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presiding. The 
State was represented by Lana Taylor, Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was 
present and represented by Robert Breeze. Evidence was presented in the form of 
testimony from witnesses for both the State and the defense. The Court, based upon the 
evidence and argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by 
counsel, and for good cause shown, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 16, 2000, Officer Jason Knight of the Salt Lake Police 
Department responded to a dispatch call of a male assaulting two females. 
2. When Officer Knight arrived on the scene, the information from dispatch 
was confirmed by one of the female victims, Chandra Karren, who told Officer Knight 
l 
that the second victim, Andrea Layne was dragged down the stairs by the defendant and 
forced inside his apartment. 
3. Officer Knight knocked on the defendant's apartment and spoke with the 
defendant through the closed door. 
4. Officer Knight asked the Defendant to open the door, so he could check on 
the welfare of Ms. Layne. 
5. The defendant refused Officer Knight's numerous requests to open the 
door. 
6. When the defendant finally opened the door, Officer Knight arrested the 
defendant for interfering with a police investigation. 
7. After the defendant was arrested and seated in a patrol car, the defendant 
said that he wanted his apartment locked up and secured. 
8. Officer Knight went back to the apartment to lock the door because the 
defendant was in custody. 
9. Officer Knight stepped inside the apartment to look for a key so he could 
lock the door and saw Ms. Karren walk out of the bedroom. 
10. Officer Knight then did a quick security check of the apartment to make 
sure no one else was in the apartment and to make sure that Ms. Layne had not re-entered 
the apartment through the cellar door. 
11. When Officer Knight looked inside the bedroom where Ms. Karren had 
come from, he saw what he believed to be controlled substances and drug paraphernalia 
laying out in the open. 
2 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer Knight reasonably believed that the defendant had been involved 
in a domestic assault and was justified in asking the defendant to exit his apartment so he 
could check on the victim's welfare. 
2. Officer Knight had probable cause to believe that the defendant had 
committed the offense of interfering with an investigation because he refused to open the 
door and comply with the officer's lawful command. 
3. The defendant was lawfully arrested when he exited the apartment. 
4. Officer Knight was justified in entering the defendant's apartment to lock 
the door because the defendant wanted the apartment secured, but was unable to do it 
himself as a result of his arrest. 
5. Officer Knight was justified in conducting a security sweep of the 
apartment because of his concerns that arose when saw Ms. Karren inside the apartment. 
6. Officer Knight was in the defendant's apartment lawfully when he saw 
what he believed to be controlled substances and drug paraphernalia laying out in the 
open. 
7. The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the plain view 
3 
doctrine . 
DATED this ^ - d a y o f /JxQ ^ 2 0 0 1 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to Form: 
Robert Breeze 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 001919867FS 
Judge LESLIE LEWIS 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress for Illegal 
Search and Seizure is denied. 
DATED this oj J day of f ,2001. 
BY THE 
Approved as to Form: 
Robert Breeze 
Attorney for Defendant 
